Research Findings in the Economics of Aging by Amy Finkelstein
This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the National Bureau of 
Economic Research
Volume Title: Research Findings in the Economics of Aging 
Volume Author/Editor: David A. Wise, editor
Volume Publisher: The University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN:  0-226-90306-0
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/wise08-1
Conference Dates: May 10-13, 2007
Publication Date: February 2010
Chapter Title:  Comment on "Mind the Gap! Consumer Perceptions and Choices of 
Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Plans"
Chapter Author:  Amy Finkelstein   
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8215
Chapter pages in book: (481 - 484)Mind the Gap!    4 8 1
Poisal, J. A. 2003. Reporting of drug expenditures in the MCBS. Health Care Financ-
ing Review 25 (2): 23–  36.
Robst, J., J. Levy, and M. Ingber. 2007. Diagnosis-  based risk adjustment for Medi-
care prescription drug plan payments. Health Care Financing Review 28 (4): 
15– 30.
Shang, B., and D. P. Goldman. 2007. Prescription drug coverage and elderly Medi-
care spending. NBER Working Paper no. 13358. Cambridge, MA: National 
Bureau of Economic Research, September.
Simon, K. I., and C. Lucarelli. 2006. What drove ﬁ  rst year premiums in stand- alone 
Medicare drug plans? NBER Working Paper no. 12595. Cambridge, MA: Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research, October.
Slaughter, L. M. 2006. Medicare Part D: The product of a broken process. New 
England Journal of Medicine 354 2314–  15.
Stuart, B., L. Simoni-  Wastila, and D. Chauncey. 2005. Assessing the impact of cov-
erage gaps in the Medicare Part D drug beneﬁ  t. Health Aﬀairs 10 (April): 
w167– w179.
Winter, J., R. Balza, F. Caro, F. Heiss, B. Jun, R. Matzkin, and D. McFadden. 2006. 
Medicare prescription drug coverage: Consumer information and preferences. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 
103 (20): 7929–  34.
Yang, Z., D. B. Gilleskie, and E. C. Norton. 2004. Prescription drugs, medical care, 
and health outcomes: A model of elderly health dynamics. NBER Working 
Paper no. 10964. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 
December.
Comment  Amy Finkelstein
This is a fascinating and extremely timely chapter analyzing the elderly’s 
enrollment choices in the new Medicare Part D prescription drug program. 
The new Medicare prescription drug beneﬁ  t, which began in 2006, arguably 
represents the largest single expansion in social insurance in the United 
States since 1965. It is therefore an extremely important program to under-
stand in its own right. In addition, the authors’ ﬁ  ndings have interesting 
implications more broadly for how to think about the optimal design of 
social insurance programs.
The chapter focuses on individuals’ decisions during the initial enrollment 
period (November 15, 2005 to May 15, 2006). It investigates the determi-
nants of both whether an individual enrolls during this period, and the 
timing of enrollment conditional on enrollment. The chapter provides both 
positive and normative analysis of the elderly’s choices. I discuss each in 
turn, and their implications for the optimal design of social insurance, par-
ticularly for oﬀering choice within a social insurance program.
Amy Finkelstein is a professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.482        Florian Heiss, Daniel McFadden, and Joachim Winter
Descriptive Analysis
The chapter begins by presenting new data from a survey that the authors 
designed and conducted. The survey contains information on whether indi-
viduals enroll during the initial enrollment period, and if so whether they 
enrolled early or late within this initial enrollment period. Individuals who 
enroll after the end of the initial enrollment period and did not have cover-
age from another source face a late enrollment penalty. This late penalty is 
designed to reduce adverse selection by encouraging individuals to enroll at 
the beginning of the program rather than waiting until they develop health 
problems. The survey also contains information on the individuals’ prior 
year drug costs, their self- reported health status, and various socioeconomic 
characteristics.
Early enrollment is rational for individuals with high expected drug costs. 
Consistent with this incentive structure, the authors ﬁ  nd that expected drug 
costs are strongly predictive (in the expected direction) of early enrollment. 
Late enrollment within the initial enrollment period is rational for individu-
als with intermediate drug costs or a high present value of the penalty; the 
incentives for late enrollment (conditional on not enrolling early) therefore 
depend not only on expected drug costs but also on other characteristics of 
the individuals, such as their preferences (for example, risk aversion) and 
their understanding of the penalty system. Again consistent with this incen-
tive structure, the authors ﬁ  nd that socioeconomic variables (which may well 
proxy for preferences or understanding of the penalty system), are the main 
drivers of the late enrollment decision; expected drug costs are only weakly 
predictive of late enrollment.
These twin results provide extremely nice examples of the diﬀerence be-
tween single dimensional and multidimensional selection problems. Stan-
dard adverse selection models of insurance markets (such as Rothschild 
and Stiglitz [1976] consider single dimensional selection; they assume that 
individuals diﬀer only in their private information about their risk type (here, 
their expected drug costs). In such models, those who have private informa-
tion that they are higher risk (higher expected drug costs) will self- select into 
the insurance market.
The authors’ results indicate that the early enrollment decision appears 
to follow these standard models and reﬂ  ect a single dimensional selection 
problem: those who expect to be higher risk are more likely to enroll early. By 
contrast, the late enrollment decision appears to be driven by factors other 
than expected risk type, such as preferences and cognition. This is consis-
tent with a growing body of empirical work suggesting that, in many insur-
ance markets, the selection problem may be multidimensional. As a result, 
diﬀerences in nonrisk characteristics of the individual can be as or more 
important than their private information about their risk type in predicting 
insurance decisions. Several recent empirical papers have found substantial Mind the Gap!    4 8 3
evidence of unobserved (by the insurance company) preference heteroge-
neity that is an important determinant of insurance decisions. Examples 
include automobile insurance (Cohen and Einav 2007), long-  term care 
insurance (Finkelstein and McGarry 2006), reverse mortgages (Davidoﬀ 
and Welke 2005), Medigap (Fang, Keane, and Silverman 2006), and annui-
ties (Einav, Finkelstein, and Schrimpf 2007). Interestingly, many of these 
insurance markets are for the elderly. Indeed, in the case of Medigap, which 
provides private health insurance to supplement some of the (other) gaps 
in Medicare, Fang, Keane, and Silverman (2006) ﬁ  nd that cognitive ability 
is an important determinant of insurance coverage. Likewise, the authors 
here conjecture that some of their socioeconomic variables may proxy for 
cognitive understanding of the penalty for late enrollment.
When selection into an insurance market is based on multiple dimen-
sions of private information—that is, preferences as well as risk type—a 
market may suﬀer from adverse selection even if expected risk type is not 
positively correlated with the coverage decision (Finkelstein and McGarry 
2006). Detecting adverse selection empirically thus becomes more diﬃcult 
once the possibility of multiple dimensions of private information (and 
hence of selection) is recognized (Chiappori et al. 2006; Finkelstein and 
Poterba 2006).
The presence of multiple dimensions of private information also raises 
interesting questions regarding optimal design of social insurance. Manda-
tory social insurance is the canonical solution to the problem of adverse 
selection in insurance markets (e.g., Akerlof 1970). Yet, as emphasized 
by Feldstein (2005) (among others), mandates are not necessarily welfare 
improving when individuals diﬀer in their preferences. When individuals 
diﬀer in both their preferences and their (privately known) risk types, man-
dates may involve a trade-  oﬀ between the allocative ineﬃciency produced 
by adverse selection and the allocative ineﬃciency produced by imposing 
a uniform, “one size ﬁ  ts all” program on individuals whose optimal insur-
ance coverage varies. Whether and which mandates can increase welfare 
thus becomes an empirical question. Analyzing the welfare consequences 
of diﬀerent mandates in turn requires estimation of the joint distribution of 
individuals’ (privately known) preferences and (privately known) risk type 
(Einav, Finkelstein, and Schrimpf 2007).
Normative Analysis
The second part of the chapter is a normative analysis of whether indi-
viduals’ enrollment decisions are “rational.” Speciﬁ  cally, the authors inves-
tigate whether individuals’ behavior matches the predictions of an optimal 
dynamic stochastic programming problem that they develop and estimate. 
They ﬁ  nd that, on the margin, individuals seem to understand the (simple) 
fact that an increase in expected drug costs increases the beneﬁ  ts from enroll-
ment. However, they also ﬁ  nd that the level of enrollment is lower than the 484        Florian Heiss, Daniel McFadden, and Joachim Winter
optimal level that they estimate, and that individuals are less aware of the 
(complicated) consequences of the penalty of late enrollment.
As the authors point out, any discrepancy between the actual choice and 
the predicted choice may reﬂ  ect a failure of rational expectations, a failure 
of optimization, and/  or a failure of the model they have speciﬁ  ed. To the 
extent that the discrepancies the authors ﬁ  nd reﬂ  ect either a failure of ratio-
nal expectations or a failure of individuals to optimize appropriately, these 
ﬁ  ndings also have implications for the beneﬁ  ts of allowing choice within 
social insurance programs. In particular, it becomes important to distinguish 
between diﬀerential behavior across individuals that reﬂ  ects real diﬀerences 
in underlying preferences as opposed to diﬀerences in behavior that reﬂ  ect 
“mistakes.” The former suggests some beneﬁ  ts from allowing individuals 
choice within social insurance, while the latter suggests that there may be 
some value to restricting choice. The authors’ interesting ﬁ  ndings suggest 
that an important direction for future work—both for Medicare Part D 
and for other social insurance programs more generally—is distinguishing 
between “true” preference heterogeneity and failures of rationality.
References
Akerlof, G. 1970. The market for “Lemons”: Quality uncertainty and the market 
mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (3): 488–  500.
Cohen, A., and L. Einav. 2007. Estimating risk preferences from deductible choice. 
American Economic Review 97 (3): 745–  88.
Chiappori, P.-  A., B. Jullien, B. Salanie, and F. Salanie. 2006. Asymmetric informa-
tion in insurance: General testable implications. RAND Journal of Economics 37 
(4). (Available online.)
Davidoﬀ, T., and G. Welke. 2005. Selection and moral hazard in the reverse mortgage 
market. University of California, Berkeley, Haas School of Business. Unpublished 
Manuscript.
Einav, L., A. Finkelstein, and P. Schrimpf. 2007. The welfare cost of asymmetric 
information: Evidence from the U.K. annuity market. NBER Working Paper no. 
13228. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, July.
Fang, H., M. Keane, and D. Silverman. 2006. Sources of advantageous selection: 
Evidence from the Medigap insurance market. NBER Working Paper no. 12289. 
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, June.
Feldstein, M. 2005. Rethinking social insurance. NBER Working Paper no. 11250. 
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, April.
Finkelstein, A., and K. McGarry. 2006. Multiple dimensions of private information: 
Evidence from the long-  term care insurance market. American Economic Review 
96 (4): 938–  58.
Finkelstein, A., and J. Poterba. 2006. Testing for adverse selection with “unused 
observables.” NBER Working Paper no. 12112. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau 
of Economic Research, March.
Rothschild, M., and J. E. Stiglitz. 1976. Equilibrium in competitive insurance mar-
kets: An essay on the economics of imperfect information. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 90 (4): 630–  49.